Abstract-Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The adversary achieves its objective by making the estimator incorrectly identify correct measurements as bad data. The proposed attack regime's significance lies in reducing the minimum sizes of successful attacks to more than half of that of undetectable data attacks. Additionally, the attack model is able to construct attacks on systems that are resilient to undetectable attacks. The conditions governing a successful data attack of the proposed model are presented along with guarantees on its performance. The complexity of constructing an optimal attack is discussed and two polynomial time approximate algorithms for attack vector construction are developed. The performance of the proposed algorithms and efficacy of the hidden attack model are demonstrated through simulations on IEEE test systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the basic facets of research and actual deployment in smart grid has been increased data collection from different meters for improved monitoring and control of dynamic events. Accurate data collection also aids formation of optimal prices and price-responsive demand. However, a data driven approach makes the grid vulnerable to cyber-attacks on meter measurements. A coordinated data attack on meter recordings in Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) [1] and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) or on the communication channels in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems can in principle lead to incorrect electricity prices as well as to large blackouts.
Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid is an active area of research. The authors of [2] first introduced the problem of undetectable data attacks that bypass bad-data tests at the state estimator. Simple linear algebraic techniques show that if the malicious measurements lie in the column space of the measurement matrix, the attack goes undetected. In reference [2] , an attack vector consisting of the malicious measurements is constructed using projection matrices based on the measurement matrix. This work has been followed by several techniques to select locations for introducing data attacks under different grid conditions and adversarial objectives. Reference [3] discusses the construction of an optimal hidden attack that requires manipulation of the minimum number of measurements using l 0 and l 1 recovery methods. Reference [4] studies the creation of the optimal attack vector as a mixed integer linear program. The authors of [5] discuss graph based design of optimal attack vectors for systems observed by PMUs. Data attacks aimed at affecting the estimation of a pre-specified set of state variables is presented in [6] . A heuristic based detector for malicious data is presented in [7] .
A majority of the prior work in this area focus on constructing hidden data attacks that evade bad-data detection tests at the state estimator. In this paper, we analyze a detectable regime of data attacks. It is worth mentioning that at the state estimator, bad data detection is followed by a scheme for bad-data identification. Our proposed attack regime succeeds despite detection by deceiving the bad-data identifier into labeling uncorrupted measurements as bad data. While writing this manuscript, we discovered a related work demonstration detectable data attacks in [8] . The attack model in [8] searches for an optimal hidden attack and then creates a detectable attack by corrupting only half of the measurements necessary for a hidden attack. In a sense, our model is a generalization of the framework used in [8] , with some key differences. Our attack model considers power system cases where a subset of the measurements are incorruptible by the adversary. By overcoming the presence of incorruptible measurements, the cardinality of our data attacks can be reduced by more than 50% of the cardinality of the optimal hidden attack, whereas in [8] , the reduction in cardinality is exactly by half. More importantly, unlike the framework in [8] our detectable attack model is able to greatly expand the range of feasible attacks to configurations where no hidden attacks are possible. Further, we show that considering incorruptible measurements in the system makes the problem of constructing an optimal detectable attack NP-hard in general. In contrast, detectable attacks that do not overcome incorruptible measurements can be constructed in polynomial time in our measurement set-up.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a description of the system model used in state estimation and bad-data detection, and then introduces our data attack model. We derive conditions necessary for a successful attack of our regime and provide provable guarantees on their cardinality in Section III. The two approximate algorithms to design an optimal attack vector for our regime are presented in Section IV. Both of them require information limited to the structure of the measurement matrix and do not need the numerical values of grid parameters. Simulations of the proposed algorithms on test IEEE bus systems are shown in Section V. Finally, concluding remarks and future directions of work are presented in Section VI. Fig. 1 . State Estimator for a power system [10] , [11] II. POWER GRID STATE ESTIMATION AND ATTACK MODELS
We represent the power grid by an undirected graph V, E, where V denotes the set of buses and E represents the set of transmission lines connecting those buses. In this paper, we consider DC power flow model [11] for state estimation in the grid that is given by:
z Hx e State Estimator: The schematic diagram of the state estimator in the grid is shown in Figure 1 [10] , [11] . For the DC model in Equation (1) Removal of Bad-data: Once bad-data is detected, the estimator tries to remove the bad-data and then re-estimate the state vector. The measurement residual vector r corresponding to the estimated x is given by r z Hx I HH
, [11] . Using this relation, we can derive the variance R r of residual r as well as the normalized residual of the data. It is shown in [10] , [11] that for the general case of multiple bad data entries (as in our case), a sequential bad-data remover described in previous literature, is sub-optimal. The optimal strategy for the estimator is to remove the minimum number of measurements such that the residual produced by the remaining measurements passes the bad-data detection test in (2) . In addition, the estimator needs to ensure that the removed measurements do not lead to a loss of rank in the measurement matrix as that will make the system unobservable. The optimal bad-data removal procedure is formulated as the following non-convex problem [10] : 
A. Attack Models
Let the adversary introduce an attack vector a in the measurements to generate the corrupted measurement vector z z a. We assume that the adversary is interested in constructing a feasible attack using minimum number of corrupted measurements (a 0 ). In a realistic setting, an adversary may be incapable of modifying certain measurements due to geographical isolation or heightened encryption. We call this set of incorruptible measurements as S m and the complimentary set of corruptible measurements as S c m . Note that measurements in S m suffer from noise and measurement errors; they are just free of adversarial manipulation. Next, we briefly describe hidden data attacks that bypass bad-data detection checks.
Undetectable Data Attack: Observe that if a Hc, the measurement residual stays the same as Σ .5 z Hx 2 Σ .5 z a Hx c 2 . Thus, an erroneous state vector x c is produced without raising any alarm at the bad-data detector [2] . The solution to Problem P-1 below gives the adversary's optimal attack vector [3] , [5] . lies in the column space of the updated measurement matrix DH. In the next section, we discuss the design of an optimal attack vector for Problem P-2.
III. OPTIMAL ATTACK VECTOR DESIGN
Consider the DC measurement model for a n bus system given in Equation (1) . We now introduce a n 1 th reference bus with phase angle 0 and augment c to form vectorĉ £ c 0¨. We also add one extra column h g after the rightmost column in measurement matrix H to create a m times n 1 modified measurement matrixĤ. We put 1 in h g for every row in H with a phase angle measurement and 0 otherwise.
We now have Hc
Note that all rows in the augmented measurement matrixĤ represent flows. We now state the following theorem without proof from [5] .
Theorem 1 ([5, Theorem 1]). There exists a non-zero binary
0 1 vector c opt of size n times 1 for an optimal attack vector a for Problem P-1 such that a 0 Hc opt 0 .
In a similar way, it can be proven through contradiction that the optimal attack vector a 1 for Problem P-2 also corresponds to a non-zero binary 0 1 vector c opt1 with a 0 d Hc opt1 0 .
Next we create a new matrix A H by replacing magnitudes of all bus susceptance inĤ with unity.
Observe that A H represents the incident matrix for a graph with n 1 nodes, with edges corresponding to measurements inĤ. We denote the graph represented by A H as G H . The (9) implies that an attack vector is feasible if the number of cut-edges included in the attack vector a is strictly greater than half of the cut-size. Our principal result on constructing an optimal data attack of our proposed regime is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let C a be a minimum cardinality cut in G H such that the number of cut-edges in C a that belong to S m is strictly less than half of the cut-size C a . An optimal attack vector for Problem P-3 is given by a sub-set of cut-edges in
Proof. Let a denote the attack vector with non-zero entries corresponding to 1 C a ~2 edges in C a 9 S c m . Thus a 0 is greater than C a ~2 and condition (9) is satisfied. The edges of C a excluded from a are removed as bad-data by the estimator. System observability is preserved if graph G H stays connected after bad-data removal. If the graph becomes disconnected after the bad-data removal, we can form a smaller feasible graph-cut using a subset of the removed edges and the ones with non-zero values in a . This contradicts the definition of C a . Hence observability is maintained by C a .
We now prove some important results on the adversarial potential of data attacks of our regime as compared to undetectable attacks.
Lemma 1. Let a
u (undetectable attack) and a d (detectable attack) respectively be the optimal attack vector designs for Problem P-1 and Problem P-2, formulated for the same system. Then the following holds:
Proof. Note that if we fix d 1 in Problems P-2 (¡ Problem P-3), it reduces to Problem P-1. The optimal undetectable attack vector a u is given by Hc u §c u x 0. Let a and 0 elsewhere. It can be easily verified that a d is a feasible detectable attack for Problem P-3. As a d is the optimal attack for Problem P-3, we have a
Note that this provides only an upper bound on the cardinality of optimal attack vectors and in practice, the reduction in cardinality can be much greater. Further the following is true:
Lemma 2. The set of system conditions with feasible data attacks for Problem P-3 is larger than that for Problem P-1.
Observe that every undetectable attack can give a corresponding feasible detectable data attack with detection for our proposed regime. However, data attacks with detection can exist for cases where no undetectable attacks are possible. For example, no undetectable attack exists if every cut in G H includes at least one incorruptible measurement. An attack with detection may exist if the number of edges of S m in a cut is less than the cut-size. The next result (proof omitted for brevity) shows that for preventing detectable attacks, at least 50% of the measurements need to be incorruptible.
Corollary 1. An attack vector for Problem P-3 always exists if less than half of the measurements in the system are incorruptible.
Thus, the number of incorruptible measurements needed to prevent a detectable attack scales with the number of edges, whereas that needed to prevent hidden attacks scales with the number of nodes in G H . In the next section, we discuss two approximate algorithms to generate attack vectors for this regime.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR ATTACK VECTOR CONSTRUCTION
Theorem 3 gives the computational complexity of finding the optimal attack vector in Problem P-3.
simulation results on the performance of the algorithms on IEEE test systems.
V. RESULTS ON IEEE TEST SYSTEMS
We run simulations in Matlab Version 2009a and present averaged results in this section. We consider the IEEE 14 bus test system [9] . In this system, we put phasor measurements on 60% of the buses and flow measurements on all lines. Figure 2 shows the average sizes of the best attack vectors constructed by our proposed solution schemes discussed in the previous section. As expected, the size of the attack vector increases with increase in the number of incorruptible measurements (S m ) in the system. Moreover, we plot the average size of undetectable attacks in the same figure to show the significant improvement in cardinality offered by our attack regime; the improvement being greater for Algorithm 2 than Algorithm 1. Next, Figure 3 plots the rise in the average fraction of cases resilient to data attacks with number of incorruptible measurements (set S m ). Observe that, unlike undetectable attacks that increasingly become infeasible at higher levels of secure measurements, feasible attacks of our proposed model are still designed by Algorithm 1 and 2. Thus, total resilience against attacks of our regime requires greater placement of secure measurements than that needed for protection against undetectable attacks. Both these figures validate our claim that data attacks with detection are far more potent than previously studied undetectable attacks. We propose a new framework of detectable data attacks on state estimation that operate by making the state estimator incorrectly label and remove good measurements as baddata. The minimum number of measurements that need to be manipulated for a successful detectable data attack is upper bounded by half of that needed for previously studied undetectable data attacks. We show that the optimal attack of our regime is given by the minimum cardinality graph cut satisfying a feasibility constraint. We prove that the problem of designing the optimal detectable attack is NP-hard and present two approximate algorithms for it. Simulations of attack vector construction on IEEE 14-bus system demonstrate that our attack regime undermines the security of state estimation further than current attack models. We are currently studying guarantees on the performance of our algorithms and design of protection schemes against our attack framework.
